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Abstract 
This paper argues that the Bakhtin Circle presents a more realistic theory of concrete 
dialogue than the theory of discourse elaborated by Habermas. The Bakhtin Circle places 
speech within the “concrete whole utterance” and by this phrase they mean that the study 
of everyday language should be analysed through the mediations of historical social 
systems such as capitalism. These mediations are also characterised by a determinate set 
of contradictions – the capital-labour contradiction in capitalism, for example – which are 
reproduced in unique ways in more concrete forms of life (the state, education, religion, 
culture, and so on). Utterances always dialectically refract these processes and as such 
are internal concrete moments, or concrete social forms, of them. Moreover, new and 
unrepeatable dialogic events arise in these concrete social forms in order to overcome and 
understand the constant dialectical flux of social life. But this theory of dialogue is 
different to that expounded by Habermas who tends to explore speech acts by 
reproducing a dualism between repeatable and universal “abstract” discursive processes 
(commonly known as the ideal speech situation) and empirical uses of discourse. These 
critical points against Habermas are developed by focusing on six main areas: sentences 
and utterances; the lifeworld and background language; active versus passive 
understandings of language; validity claims; obligation and relevance in language; and 
dialectical universalism.    
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Jürgen Habermas has been rightly praised for his work on areas as diverse as social 
theory, philosophy of language, ethics, and modernity. Many of these areas are brought 
together in the pioneering work The Theory of Communicative Action (1984; 1987) in 
which Habermas outlines a consensus theory of deliberation based on a division between 
systems and lifeworld. Systems encompass self-contained and self-reproducing 
subsystems whose principle aim is to carry out single functional tasks for society as a 
whole (Habermas 1987, p. 172). Habermas has in mind the subsystems of the modern 
economy and the administrative (state) system which are each guided by single functional 
tasks for society as whole. In the economy, for example, we discover the functional self-
reproduction of wages exchanged against labour and goods as well as services exchanged 
against consumer demand. In the administrative system, for example, we discover the 
functional self-reproduction of political decisions that engender mass loyalty from voters 
and the functional self-reproduction of administrative performance in exchange for taxes 
(Habermas 1987, p. 319). 
Whereas systems are motivated by action orientated towards the successful 
achievement of functional tasks, Habermas suggests that the lifeworld is mediated 
through communicative action founded on the necessity to reach understanding between 
participants. Three structural properties – culture, society and personality – are evident in 
the lifeworld and these are related to three further reproduction processes of cultural 
reproduction, social integration and socialisation. 
I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which participants in 
communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an 
understanding about something in the world. I use the term society for the 
legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships in social 
groups and thereby secure solidarity. By personality I understand the 
competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him in a 
position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert 
his own identity (Habermas 1987, p. 138, italics in the original). 
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Habermas further argues that from these three structural components a person will if the 
need arises be able to justify their argument through rational reflection based on three 
universal validity claims: that the propositional content of what is said is true; that the 
performative content is normatively correct; and that the intentions expressed are sincere 
(Habermas 1984, pp. 69-70; see also the next sections). Commonly known as the ‘ideal 
speech situation’ such validity claims act as a constraint on discourse by moving a 
speaker to embark on a process of argumentation with a listener with the result being that 
a consensus of understanding about an issue under consideration can be reached. One of 
Habermas’s main points in outlining his theory of communicative action is therefore to 
show that strategic and functional action is parasitic on discursive communicative action. 
That is to say, communicative action is the primary mode of interaction in modern 
society and is designed to elicit consensus and understanding between participants. 
Action that appears in systems subsequently presupposes communicative forms of action 
and rationality.  
Habermas has however been extensively criticised in making this claim. One set 
of common criticisms insist that communicative action unnecessarily abstracts away from 
‘ordinary’ and ‘everyday’ discursive encounters in empirical social contexts. Thompson 
(1982, pp. 126-129) presents an early version of this criticism when he argues that the 
ideal speech situation tends to ignore how a multitude of everyday forms of speech such 
as telling jokes have no need to raise validity claims. Thompson also adds that the 
consensus aimed for by the ideal speech situation could in theory be reached without 
recourse to validity claims. For example, a consensus might arise which simply reflects 
an existing status quo. In this instance, constraints on discursive consensus such as wealth 
or social esteem are just as important as validity claims. 
Other critical theorists have made similar observations to the extent that they 
suggest Habermas presents a disembodied account of deliberation insofar that the ideal 
speech situation is divorced from how discourse is actually produced in concrete social 
settings (McNay 2008, p. 86). Benhabib (1986) for example is critical of Habermas’s 
insistence that discourse concerns the ability of people to consider normative questions 
from a universalist standpoint in order to arrive at a moral consensus. According to 
Benhabib, this creates a trans-contextual form of argumentation which diminishes the 
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impact of “real conflict situations” (Benhabib 1986, p. 321). It is therefore not at all clear 
why participants would be willing to take part in an ideal speech situation if they believe 
their ‘conflict situations’ will not be granted due respect during the deliberative process 
(Benhabib 1986, p. 321). Young (1987) makes a similar point when she notes that 
Habermas’s ideal speech situation: 
(E)xpels and devalues difference, the concreteness of the body, the affective 
aspects of speech, the musical and figurative aspects of all utterances…(Young 
1987, p. 71). 
Elsewhere Benhabib (1992) argues that Habermas stands in a long line of liberal 
theorists all too ready to construct a ‘generalised other’, a non-corporeal substance, 
through which individuals communicate with one another in a position of equality. For 
Benhabib the problem with this theoretical viewpoint is that it creates an ideal-typical 
moral subject disembodied from real social relations. Benhabib compares the generalised 
other to what she theoretically prefers as a “concrete other”. The concrete other refers to 
“forms of behaviour through which the other feels recognised and confirmed as a 
concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents and capacities” (Benhabib 1992, p. 
159). It is through the concrete other that morality is able to relate directly to everyday 
knowledge such as childhood experiences, relationships of everyday care, popular 
beliefs, and ordinary identity formations. In other words, Benhabib highlights the need to 
move beyond the non-historical and non-social ‘liberal subject’ of the generalised other; a 
subject premised on abstract and trans-contextual modes of rationality and individualism 
(see also Fraser 1992). The purpose of this paper is to argue that it does indeed make 
sense to criticise Habermas for placing undue emphasis on an ideal speech situation to the 
neglect of more concrete factors during deliberative encounters. Unlike some social 
theorists, however, this argument will be made by recourse to the ideas of Mikhail 
Bakhtin and his collaborators Pavel Medvedev and V. N. Voloshinov who have become 
known as the Bakhtin Circle.  
In many respects this choice might appear somewhat strange considering that the 
Bakhtin Circle share remarkable similarities with Habermas in how they examine 
language. For example, Bakhtin like Habermas is interested in how language is mediated 
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through ethical values such as sincerity and truth and how these gain meaning through 
everyday background forms of communication. And some Bakhtinians have used the 
Bakhtin Circle to present a more concrete approach to deliberation that complements 
Habermas’s more abstract approach. Nielsen (1995, p. 808) for instance suggests that an 
over-reliance on Habermas leads to a rigid adherence of universal pragmatics and 
normative procedures at the expense of how people creatively use utterances during 
actual dialogic acts. An over-reliance on the Bakhtin Circle on the other hand leads one to 
embrace a one-sided emphasis on everyday dialogic consciousness at the expense of 
reconstructing normative explanations (see also Nielsen 2002, pp. 27-48). But when 
employed together these problems can be ironed out and a theory developed that stresses 
creativity in dialogue by ordinary people alongside normative commitments operating in 
language use. One final similarity concerns Habermas’s and the Bakhtin Circle’s use of 
the term “utterance” when talking about the creative use of language in everyday life. 
Indeed, Habermas often integrates one of his key analytical terms, namely speech acts, 
with that of utterances (e.g. Habermas 1984, p. 278). And like the Bakhtin Circle, 
Habermas makes a distinction between sentences and utterances by claiming that the 
elemental unit of language is the sentence whereas the elemental unit of speech is the 
utterance, or speech act (Habermas 1979, p. 31).  
Despite these complementarities and similarities the paper will nevertheless argue 
that the Bakhtin Circle is more attuned to how language is actually used in everyday and 
real acts of speech than is Habermas. Of course, and as has already been noted, many 
others such as Benhabib have made similar arguments against Habermas in the past (see 
also Cooren 2000, p. 295). Indeed, some Bakhtinians also suggest that the Bakhtin Circle 
appreciate to a far greater degree than Habermas how language exists in embodied living 
dialogue populated by innumerable concrete intentions. The ideal speech situation with 
its emphasis on clear unmediated understanding is thus found wanting from a Bakhtinian 
perspective because it fails to appreciate how concrete utterances are in fact “complex 
amalgams of different points of view” (Gardiner 2004, pp. 37).  
While the paper is sympathetic to these critical observations it nevertheless 
departs from them in one substantial way. Often, the claims made against Habermas turn 
in their known respective ways on the point that the ideal speech situation simply ignores 
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or brackets out concrete and embodied everyday (empirical) experiences. Yet, this critical 
observation tends to establish a binary dualism in social theory whereby an abstract 
theoretical standpoint (in this case Habermas’s ideal speech situation) is contrasted to a 
concrete/empirical theoretical standpoint (e.g. Benhabib’s preferred position). Such a 
dualism therefore enables Habermasians to argue that critics have merely misinterpreted 
Habermas’s oeuvre. For example, supporters insist that Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action is clearly premised on the idea that intersubjective discourse will 
be expressed in part through everyday passionate narratives around sincere personal 
experiences which are attuned to concrete experiences (Dahlberg 2005). Indeed, some 
argue that Habermas’s injunction to examine a specific state of affairs, contextual norms, 
and inner states of self present a set of concrete theoretical terms that can be applied 
critically to empirical research contexts in order to ascertain how real discursive 
participants accept or reject some specific concrete state of affairs, consent or challenge a 
set of concrete norms, and trust or challenge another’s outwardly expressed inner states 
of self (Forester 1992, p. 49).  
For its part, this paper instead argues for a dialectical and materialist approach to 
these issues that conceptualises “abstract” and “concrete” as having an internal and 
necessary relationship. In practice this viewpoint conceptualises utterances as concrete 
and contradictory internalisations of more abstract material contradictory processes. 
Concrete utterances thus obtain ideological forms of existence because they refract, or are 
moments of, more abstract determinate contradictory social relations. A typical 
illustration of this point is that of capitalism. From a materialist perspective capitalism is 
comprised at an abstract level by the determinate contradiction between capital and 
labour. Yet this contradiction is refracted in qualitatively unique ways into concrete 
social forms. But as qualitative contradictory forms, these refracted concrete processes 
often prove problematic for the functional reproduction of more abstract contradictions. 
However, this is to be expected from a dialectical perspective which underlines the 
importance of contradictions in facilitating, disrupting, and breaking apart social life. 
Furthermore, this dialectical perspective enables the Bakhtin Circle to not only embrace 
ethical questions in their overall theory of dialogue but also to overcome the perennial 
problems of equating the concrete with the empirically observable and then separating 
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both from abstract social processes. Arguably, it is Habermas and many of his critics who 
reproduce these problems in their respective theories of language. The Bakhtin Circle on 
the contrary is interested in thinking about how abstract social processes are refracted in 
concrete utterances, with the “concrete” being analysed at different levels of abstraction. 
Some concrete utterances will thus be located at a more empirical level than other 
concrete utterances, ensuring that the concrete is not theorised as being necessarily the 
same as the empirically observable. National languages, for instance, are a concrete 
manifestation of the more abstract properties of language but this does not mean that 
national languages should necessarily be analysed in their empirical use by any single 
speaker. What is distinctive about the paper’s take on these issues, then, is that it 
demonstrates how a Bakhtinian dialectical approach to concrete dialogue opens up the 
possibility to examine ethical questions about dialogue in their concrete and everyday use 
without reproducing some of the problems embedded in Habermas’s more abstract theory 
of discourse.  
The next section begins this critical discussion by looking at how Habermas and 
the Bakhtin Circle explore language. This is a particularly useful place to begin the 
discussion because while both seem to have similar ideas on this subject it will 
nevertheless be possible to argue that important differences are also evident between 
them on how they conceptualise sentences and utterances. In particular, the next section 
begins to set out how the Bakhtin Circle develops a materialist theory of language quite 
at odds with Habermas’s theory. This will provide a basis in later sections to critically 
explore some of other key insights on Habermas’s ideal type theory of discourse through 
the Bakhtin Circle’s dialectical theory of dialogue, especially in the areas of the 
lifeworld, validity claims, and universalism. 
 
Sentences and utterances 
In an early essay written in 1976 Habermas states: “We regard the speech act as the 
elementary unit of speech – i.e. as the smallest (verbal) utterance sequence which is 
comprehensible and acceptable to at least one other component actor within a 
communications context” (Habermas 1976, p. 155). Drawing from amongst others the 
 8 
speech act theory of John Austin, Habermas argues language is mediated through three 
speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. Locutionary acts refer to states 
of affairs and consist of propositional sentences. Illocutionary acts constitute the 
performative moment of language in so far that an action is performed by a speaker at the 
moment they say something. Often illocutionary acts are created through a performative 
verb in the first person presence such as “I hereby promise you…” (Habermas 1984, p. 
289). Propositional elements of illocutionary speech acts are therefore arrived at through 
pragmatic conditions. Perlocutionary acts refer to the moment when a speaker produces 
an effect in the world. These acts thus exist externally to the meaning of what is said. But 
whereas perlocutionary acts intervene in the world to causally affect somebody else, 
illocutionary acts, in the very nature of the discursive act itself, seek to create 
understanding between participants. Illocutionary speech acts are thus “achieved at the 
level of interpersonal relations on which participants in communication come to an 
understanding with something in the world” (Habermas 1984, p. 293). 
   For Habermas, it is the illocutionary moment in language which provides a crucial 
coordinating axis for communication. This is because illocutionary speech acts – “to act 
in saying something” (Habermas 1984, p. 289; italics in the original) – open up the 
possibility to arrive at consensus and understanding between individuals through 
argumentation within the very structure of language itself. In particular, Habermas argues 
that three validity claims of truth, normative rightness and truthfulness are present in 
illocutionary acts (see Habermas 1979, p. 32).
1
 Argumentation thus builds an 
                                                          
1
 Illocutionary speech can be broken down into three further speech acts which correspond to these three 
validity claims. Constative speech acts refer to assertions, descriptions, classifications, predictions 
objections, and so on, through which we make claims of “truth of corresponding propositions…” 
(Habermas 1979, p. 63). Constative speech acts thus “contain the offer to recur if necessary to the 
experiential source from which the speaker draws the certainty that his statement is true” (Habermas 1979, 
63-4, italics in the original). Regulative speech acts refer to requests, orders, promises, excuses, 
admonitions, and so on, through which we make claims about “the rightness of norms or to the ability of 
the subject to assume responsibility” (Habermas 1979, p. 63). Therefore, “regulative speech acts contain 
only the offer to indicate, if necessary, the normative context that gives the speaker the conviction that his 
utterance is right” (Habermas 1979, p. 64, italics in the original). Expressive speech acts refer to beliefs, 
hopes, fears, desires, and so on, through which we aim to (e.g.) truthfully reveal ourselves to another or to 
deceive. “(I)n the expressive use of language the speaker also enters into a speech-act-immanent 
obligation…to prove trustworthy…to show in the consequences of his action that he has expressed just that 
intention which actually guides his behaviour” (Habermas 1979, p. 64; italics in the original; see also 
Habermas 1984, p. 309). 
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interpersonal relationship between participants whereby reasons are put forward as to the 
validity status of certain utterances. A basis is therefore created for consensus to be 
arrived at (see Habermas 1984, p. 293). To successfully undertake this task both speaker 
and hearer must also be satisfied that certain conditions have been met. Key for 
Habermas to this “binding” effect of validity between speaker and hearer is that of a 
“warranty” to provide convincing reasons for holding a particular belief to criticisms 
against it. 
Thus a speaker owes the binding…force of his illocutionary act not to the validity 
of what is said but to the coordinating effect of the warranty that he offers; 
namely to redeem, if necessary, the validity raised with his speech act (Habermas 
1984, p. 302, italics in the original). 
The main difference then between a sentence and a speech act, or utterance, is that a 
sentence aims to be comprehensible to another person whereas a speech act aims to be 
both comprehensible and to reach understanding between interlocutors by raising validity 
claims (Habermas 1979, p. 32).  
Rejecting a Kantian transcendental viewpoint where a priori conditions of 
experience are established at the outset, Habermas therefore instead argues for a weaker 
or “detranscendentalized” theory (Habermas 2003, pp. 88-90) in which the “hypothetical 
proposal” of discourse (the ideal speech situation) “can be tested against new 
experiences” (Habermas 1979, p. 21; see also Habermas 1993, pp. 8-14) based on an 
ideal set of obligations within validity claims, i.e. obligations to provide grounds and 
justification for a belief and to prove trustworthy in doing so (Habermas 1979, p. 65). 
Thus Habermas suggests that when people communicate with one another they must 
inevitably presuppose that “a totality of independently existing objects” are apparent even 
if one can focus only on “spatiotemporally identifiable objects” at any one moment in 
time (Habermas 2003, p 89). In other words, while Habermas is adamant that such ideal 
conditions transcend “the provincial standards of a merely particular community of 
interpreters and their spatiotemporally localized communicative practice” (Habermas 
1993, p. 52) he is also clear that validity claims designed to elicit understanding only gain 
a sense of obligation in pragmatic empirical conditions. Correspondingly, Habermas 
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insists that speech acts should first be investigated through “standard forms of meaning”, 
i.e. a speaker’s precise, explicit and literal intention and meaning in a proposition should 
ideally be matched to the literal meaning of a sentence. Only then is it possible to connect 
a speech act with a meaning in a sentence used to express propositional content (see 
Habermas 1979, pp. 39-40).  
But it is at this point that we must question some of these claims about language. 
In particular, Habermas ties together utterances and sentences far too closely even at a 
high level of theoretical abstraction. As Cooke (1994, pp. 124-125) notes, Habermas 
seems to conflate propositional content in speech acts employed in real contexts with 
meanings evident in abstract sentences. Of course, Habermas is also aware that “(l)iteral 
meanings are…relative to deep-seated, implicit knowledge about which we normally 
know nothing, because it is simply unproblematic and does not pass the threshold of 
communicative utterances that can be valid or invalid” (Habermas 1984, p. 337, italics in 
the original). Yet he also resolute that while “deep-seated implicit knowledge” is a crucial 
context-dependent moment for validity claims it is still nevertheless the case that speech 
acts carried out through trans-contextual invariant “standard conditions” are the 
presupposition of communication orientated toward understanding.   
According to Bakhtin it is wrong to conflate sentences with utterances in this 
manner even at a relatively high level of theoretical abstraction. As opposed to 
utterances, sentences are abstract units of meaning which frequently remain identical 
irrespective of time or space and can therefore be repeated “in completely identical form” 
(Bakhtin 1986, p. 108). One of the reasons why sentences remain identical is that they are 
ultimately comprised of “neutral dictionary meanings” devoid of context and generic 
specification (Bakhtin 1986, p. 88). It is for this reason that sentences are usually 
explored by linguists as existing in abstract grammatical systems of normative forms (see 
Bakhtin 1981, p. 288). In reality, however, no abstract stable normative form of language 
is present as such during actual dialogic events because each time a word is repeated and 
uttered in a real live event through real live utterances it is immediately transformed into 
a new dialogic theme (see also the next section). In contrast to sentences, therefore, 
utterances make use of words in language but do so by imbuing words with intentions 
and evaluative accents. “(A)ll words have the ‘taste’ of a profession, a genre, a tendency, 
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a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day, the 
hour” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 293). Social class is an obvious illustration of this point. 
Different social classes will “accent” various utterances through particular evaluations 
based on factors such as “title…rank, wealth, social importance…” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 96). 
When people from different social classes engage in dialogue with one another, then their 
distinct evaluative accents will become more noticeable in a variety of ways. Familiar 
and intimate styles of address might not be apparent during this dialogic encounter, while 
difference might also be apparent in how each evaluates the other’s dialogical response 
(Bakhtin 1986, p. 97).  
While this approach to language might look to be the same to that proposed by 
Habermas there is in fact an important difference between the two. Habermas claims that 
speech acts operate at an invariant level at some distance from specific propositional 
content (Habermas 1979, p. 41). Therefore the normative form of a speech act always 
stays the same even if the propositional content differs in each actual empirical utterance. 
This is one reason why Habermas argues that standard forms of speech acts can be 
simply appropriated by propositional content; a content which corresponds to meanings 
given in sentences. From the perspective of the Bakhtin Circle, Habermas is wrong to 
claim that utterances can be analysed in such standard forms. In the first instance, 
pragmatic meaning of a proposition which is employed by a single speaker cannot 
correspond to precise meaning of a sentence because words exist in “in other people’s 
mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 
294). That is to say, words are inherently dialogical and so come to us through other 
people’s accents and evaluations: “the word in language is half someone else’s” (Bakhtin 
1981, p. 293). Of course, it does not follow that a speaker can never populate a word 
“with his own accent” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 293). Yet this occurs through the already 
dialogical nature of language. A speaker will subsequently have to forgo the trans-
contextual standardised speech acts which Habermas champions in order to make a word 
meaningful to a dialogic event at hand. Words cannot thereby exist in trans-contextual, 
standard, or invariant forms, and a word’s meaning cannot simply be appropriated by 
individuals to express his or her literal meaning (after all language is awash with the 
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intentions of others and this entails that some words will for whatever reason resist 
appropriation by others).  
In the second instance, Habermas is unequivocal in “restricting” his analysis “to 
paradigmatic cases of linguistically explicit action that is oriented to reaching 
understanding” (Habermas 1979, p. 35). This is the reason why he initially brackets out 
of an ideal speech situation “institutionally bounded speech actions”. With institutionally 
bounded speech actions language will always be mediated by the normative meaning of 
the institution in question. That is to say, institutions merely articulate conventions but 
not meaningful procedures of argumentation (Habermas 1990, p. 92). A christening at a 
church serves as an illustration. In the confines of the institution of a church a baby is 
christened by following the already accepted conventions of what a christening entails. 
No argumentation is required of why these conventions are being followed during the 
christening event itself. Indeed, it would be rather strange if a person attempted to 
challenge these conventions by standing up and denouncing them through validity claims.  
Institutionally unbounded speech acts, on the other hand, need only meet 
conditions of a generalised context for reaching understanding (Habermas 1979, p. 38). 
Practical discourse, for Habermas, is thus an endeavour to get to grips with a number of 
idealizing assumptions which all those engaged in argumentation must make during a 
discursive encounter. Idealizing assumptions include the tenets that “all affected can in 
principle freely participate as equals in a cooperative search for the truth in which the 
force of the better argument alone can influence the outcome” and that “only moral rules 
that could win the assent of all affected as participants in a practical discourse can claim 
validity” (Habermas 1993, pp. 49-50). To clarify, then, Habermas wants to separate an 
ideal speech situation based on “transcendental constraints” which “make possible the 
practice that participants understand as argumentation” from concrete institutionalised 
discourses that “obligate specific groups of people to engage in argumentation” through 
conventions (Habermas 1993, p. 31, italics in the original). 
But the Bakhtin Circle are highly critical of those theories that put forward a 
dualist argument which suggests that abstract meanings in language forms gain 
significance by being creatively used by people in empirically observed social contexts 
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(see Voloshinov 1973, pp. 45-64). For example, in Habermas’s case this problematic 
dualism is reproduced in the distinction between practical discourse and its institutional 
appearance in a concrete context. In making this distinction it is not entirely clear how 
language gains specific meanings and themes through various historical levels of 
analysis. As Kent observes: 
Contextual analysis certainly helps to explain why a sentence – as an utterance – 
might be interpreted to mean x in situation y, but contextual analysis can tell us 
nothing about how the sentence came to mean x in situation y (Kent 1993, p. 
138).      
For the Bakhtin Circle, however, utterances live and breathe in real historical and 
socially specific environments in which dialogue “cannot fail to brush up against 
thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around a 
given object of an utterance” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 276; see also Bakhtin 1986, p. 109). This 
does not mean that the Bakhtin Circle reduces dialogue to empirical interactions between 
speakers and hearers. Quite the opposite is true. They recognise that everyday dialogue is 
complexly structured and stratified by different social forces such as social groups, social 
classes, social professions, social structures, social belief systems, seemingly unified 
national language, and so on (Bakhtin 1981, p. 288). As Bakhtin observes:   
Oppositions between individuals are only surface upheavals…of those elements 
that play on such individual oppositions, make them contradictory, saturate their 
consciousness and discourses with more a more fundamental speech diversity 
(Bakhtin 1981, p. 326, italics in the original).  
 
The complexity of dialogue cannot therefore be framed only through “mere 
conversations between persons” in clear empirically marked boundaries (Bakhtin 1981, p. 
326). Each empirical context uniquely refracts the historically specific social complexity 
of life at different levels of abstraction. Indeed, Bakhtin and Medvedev make the 
dialectical point that a single empirical object gains a unique individual identity only to 
the extent that it is seen as belonging to “a complex system of interconnections and 
mutual influences” (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 27). For example, a single book of 
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literature cannot be fully understood outside of the wider ideological field of literature. In 
turn, this field cannot be fully understood outside of a wider ideological environment of 
other interacting social fields (education, politics, welfare, religion, media, and so on), 
which are themselves mediated through historically specific and deeper systemic 
contradictions such as those associated with social class relations. None of this is of 
course to suggest that a one-way causal process can be observed between these 
mediations. Bakhtin and Medvedev clearly state that while an “external” environment 
affects the “internal” identity of an empirical object it is also the case that the “internal” 
identity is already an integral unique moment of an “external” environment (e.g. a single 
book is already a unique moment in a literary field and thus a unique moment of a 
number of other fields). This “simple dialectic” implies that “the intrinsic turns out to be 
extrinsic, and the reverse” (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 29; see also Bakhtin 1984: 
pp. 26-27; Roberts 2004a; see also the sections below).  
It is therefore misguided to conceive of an ideal speech situation as being simply 
reproduced in an empirical concrete setting. What such an approach by-passes are the 
complex mediations of a concrete dialogic event. Indeed, the problem of simply bringing 
together both abstract speech acts in a creative concrete context becomes apparent with 
Habermas when he has to resort to intuition in order to explain the gap between ideal 
speech and its empirical use. For example, Habermas says that “(e)very speaker knows 
intuitively that an alleged argument is not a serious one if the appropriate (i.e. ideal – 
JMR) conditions are violated…” (Habermas 1993, p. 56). The Bakhtin Circle argues to 
the contrary that there can be no ‘intuition’ as such in dialogue because this is a trans-
historical and trans-contextual view of dialogue. What might appear to be intuition is in 
fact a thought process which has already been historically situated and subject to dialogic 
processes. Thus it is exactly this ‘intuitive’ moment that we need to investigate because 
what might conceivably seem to be a deeply embedded inner, almost primordial, moment 
of the psyche has already accommodated itself “to the potentialities of our expression, its 
possible routes and directions” (Voloshinov 1973, p. 91, italics in the original).2 
                                                          
2
 Anyhow, by having to resort to ‘intuition’ there is a danger that Habermas will end up defending the ideal 
speech situation by resorting to a psychological rather than social explanation.     
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In the next section we will expand on these critical points in more detail by 
focusing on how Habermas examines taken-for-granted assumptions in his depiction of 
the lifeworld. In particular it will be argued that Habermas articulates a passive 
understanding of the lifeworld which is at variance with an active understanding of 
background language by the Bakhtin Circle. This will be achieved by illustrating how the 
Bakhtin Circle not only accounts for dialogue in empirical contexts but also how they 
explore utterances as being integrally related to other socially mediated concrete factors 
such as evaluations, themes and speech genres. By focusing in particular on everyday 
language use and utterance themes the next section will deepen our analysis of the 
Bakhtin Circle’s ideas on the concrete use of language and dialogue, which will in turn be 
used to make further critical observations on Habermas. 
 
Lifeworld and background language  
As well as its three structural properties (culture, society and personality) Habermas 
suggests that the lifeworld is comprised by a pre-reflective background taken-for-granted 
set of established assumptions. Lifeworld assumptions come together to form “the 
horizon of everyday action” (Habermas 1984, p. 335) made up of implicit knowledge. 
Communicative action, which itself is located in this horizon, is the reflective moment of 
taken-for-granted assumptions evident in the lifeworld (see also Habermas 1984, pp. 70-
71).   
Each communicative act is first informed by the background assumptions of 
specific empirical plans of action while themes play an important role in the lifeworld in 
so far that they act as a sort of mediator between everyday empirical assumptions and 
communicative action. Habermas illustrates this point through the everyday plan of 
action in which an older construction worker asks a new younger worker to fetch some 
beers for a midmorning snack. We thus see the following relationship at play in this 
empirical situation. 
The theme is the upcoming midmorning snack; taking care of the drinks is a goal 
related to this theme; one of the older workers comes up with the plan to send the 
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‘new guy’, who, given his status, cannot easily get around this request (Habermas 
1987, p. 121, italics in the original). 
 At least initially the order to get beers must be perceived against the taken-for-granted 
background horizon through which workers recognise the informal hierarchy in operation 
in this empirical workplace and recognise the everyday temporal pattern that stipulates 
there will soon be a break. Theme and plan thus “mark off a situation from the lifeworld 
of those directly involved” in an action situation. And by marking off a situation the 
possibility presents itself for communicative action to arise. The younger worker might 
for example challenge the order through one or more of the three validity claims. 
How the Bakhtin Circle discusses the background of dialogue is similar although 
also subtly different to Habermas. Like Habermas, Bakhtin argues: 
The linguistic significance of a given utterance is understood against the 
background of language, while its actual meaning is understood against the 
background of other concrete utterances on the same theme… (Bakhtin 1981, p. 
281). 
Yet Bakhtin immediately follows this by saying that the background language of other 
concrete utterances is “made up of contradictory opinions, points of view and value 
judgements…” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 281). In other words, how language is actually used in 
real utterances is dependent on a language background which is in itself contradictory 
and constantly in flux. Background language thus contains “the co-existence of socio-
ideological contradictions” of different temporal moments and different socio-ideological 
viewpoints evident in groups of people, organisations, and so on (Bakhtin 1981, p. 291). 
Workplaces typically exhibit many of these contradictions. For example, a workplace 
often harbours a contradiction between the interests of employees and those of 
management. Whilst management might use certain utterances to insinuate that all are 
part of a work-related ‘family’, employees might to the contrary be sceptical of such 
language, believing instead that it masks stringent managerial prerogatives (Roberts 
2009). Or there might be a contradiction in the workplace between improvements in 
technology used by workers and the use of this technology by management to intensify 
labour output (Gough 2003, pp.52-53). Or there could also be a contradiction between 
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collaborative working practices and individualised wage relations that force workers to 
forgo collaboration in favour of entering into competition with one another (Adler 2006, 
pp. 185-187). The important point is that utterances will internalise and refract such 
material contradictions in their own unique manner (see Voloshinov 1973, pp. 9-24).  
How Bakhtin characterises the background of language and its relationship to 
theme and utterances is therefore significantly different to how Habermas characterises 
background knowledge in the lifeworld. As we have seen, the lifeworld for Habermas is 
comprised of taken-for-granted assumptions that create consensual understanding within 
a specific empirical context. Even a theme and its associated plan of action do not 
necessarily disrupt this consensual understanding. In relation to the example of the 
workers Habermas assumes that the habit of taking a break at a particular time is already 
consensually expressed by workers before the appearance of the new worker commanded 
to fetch beer. Indeed, Habermas says there is a normative framework functioning here in 
which all accept that one person is allowed to tell another to do something. In this 
situation, then, theme merely represents the thematic unity of the various already 
established meanings of taking a break in an empirical context.  
The Bakhtin Circle agrees that meaning in words is often self-reproducible in 
empirical contexts. However, they additionally argue that meaning has an abstract 
existence which only becomes significant during an actual dialogic event in unique and 
unrepeatable concrete themes. Themes refract the inherent socio-ideological 
contradictions embedded in background language, and the theme of an utterance 
transforms abstract meanings into a concrete and historical living whole (Voloshinov 
1973, p. 99). Theme and meaning exist in a dialectical relationship and no understanding 
of one can be comprehensively accomplished without an understanding of the other. 
Meaning is “the technical apparatus for the implementation of a theme” while theme is a 
reaction by participants to their dialogic “generative process of existence” (Voloshinov 
1973, p. 100). In other words, one of the problems with Habermas’s presentation of 
lifeworld and theme is that it lacks a theory of contradiction. As such it is difficult to see 
how creative activity and learning might ensue in a dialogic context such as a particular 
workplace. Contradictions elicit critical thinking on the part of social individuals like 
workers because they throw up specific problems that need to be solved (see Livingstone 
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and Sawchuk 2004). But as is evident from his discussion of the midmorning snack, 
Habermas prefers to highlight consensual taken-for-granted expectations in a workplace. 
Instead of a word containing a homogeneous meaning, then, it is truer to say that 
a single word often contains a multiplicity of potential meanings because it is reproduced 
within a plethora of unique themes during a dialogic event. Each word in the sentence, ‘I 
love you’, contains a meaning. But when transformed into an utterance during an actual 
dialogic event these meanings gain new potential as they take on unrepeatable thematic 
potency. “I love you” might for instance be transformed into a theme of sarcasm if 
uttered by one spurned lover in an argument with his/her now ex-partner. Meaning is thus 
fluid and not static because as it moves through themes it undergoes change (Moro 1999: 
169). Subsequently, one can discern a multiplicity of content and sense of an utterance 
depending on the dialectical interplay of meaning and theme during specific dialogic 
events. To summarise, whereas Habermas tends to explore discursive themes to 
emphasise thematic unity of meaning the Bakhtin Circle examine theme to highlight 
unrepeatable dialogic events that make use of but also transcend a given meaning (see 
Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 132).  
The issue of contradiction in language will be discussed again in later sections 
when the Bakhtin Circle’s dialectical viewpoint is explored in more depth. Before that 
discussion however it is important to comprehensively demonstrate how the Bakhtin 
Circle’s theory of background language equips one with an active understanding of 
dialogue quite at odds with a passive understanding of discourse.  
 
Active understanding of dialogue vs. a passive understanding of 
discourse 
Encompassed in a Bakhtinian view of background language is an active understanding of 
dialogue. Active understanding endeavours to grasp how an utterance is integrally related 
to a world of “contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgements” embedded in 
background language. An utterance directed towards an object will therefore immediately 
encounter an array of other utterances imbued with values, points of views, shared 
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thoughts, accents, and so on about the object in question (Bakhtin 1981, p. 276). One 
word is thus answerable to other words because it anticipates how a hearer, or number of 
hearers, will respond to one’s own words through the diverse utterances of others. 
Response is thereby predicated on assimilating the multiaccentual and inner dialectical 
nature of a word into one’s own conceptual system and merging this word with a 
responsive address to a hearer or number of hearers (Bakhtin 1981: 282). Typically, then, 
real everyday speech performs a role for the transmission of values, judgements, 
recollections, and so on, of other people’s utterances. When we hear such speech it is 
over laden with such words as, “He says…”, “it is said…”, “people say…” The point to 
make is that everyday speech will contain words that will in fact be half of another 
person’s words “transmitted with varying degrees of precision and impartiality…” 
(Bakhtin 1981, p. 339). Responsive attitudes underline everyday speech ensuring that a 
speaker can immediately become a listener and vice versa. Listeners actively prepare 
their answers as a speaker is speaking to them and will agree or disagree with a speaker 
through this responsive attitude. Understanding is therefore also a responsive attitude so 
that a listener will become a speaker and vice versa. Background language is 
subsequently pregnant with possibilities linked to answerability and unrepeatable themes. 
Bakhtin compares an active understanding of dialogue with a passive 
understanding of language. Confined to analysing what is the same within common 
language, a passive understanding explores “an utterance’s neutral signification and not 
its actual meaning” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 281, italics in the original). The problem with a 
passive understanding of language, then, is that it tends to examine clarity elicited by 
utterances at the expense of investigating how utterances actually play themselves out in 
real dialogic events. One notable illustration explored from the previous section, which 
again is highlighted by Cooke (1994: 128), comes in the form of a “semanticist 
abstraction” used by Habermas that he himself warns against, namely explaining the 
meaning of an utterance from the meaning of a sentence independent of its actual use in 
real dialogic encounters (see for example Habermas 1990, pp. 69-70). Cooke, however, 
thinks this is not a fatal flaw in Habermas’s theory. For example, reaching understanding 
between a speaker and a hearer is also based on everyday narratives that exist in concrete 
space and time (Cooke 1994, p. 128; see also the useful discussion in McCarthy 1978, pp. 
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273-82). But while this is true there are three reasons why we should remain cautious of 
Habermas’s success in fully escaping a passive understanding of the lifeworld in a 
Bakhtinian sense.  
First, even if we accept Cooke’s point it is still the case that Habermas views the 
lifeworld as being a rather fixed and static domain for communication. As he says of the 
pre-reflective status of the lifeworld: “Single elements, specific taken-for-granteds, 
are…mobilised in the form of consensual and yet problematizable knowledge only when 
they become relevant to a situation” (Habermas 1987, p. 124). Such elements are 
therefore predominantly conceived as being ‘unshaken convictions’ which are only 
reflected on during communicative acts. Lifeworld knowledge is thus explored as a 
“stock of knowledge (which) supplies members with unproblematic, common, 
background convictions that are assumed to be guaranteed…” (Habermas 1987, p. 125; 
see also Lecercle 2009, p. 55). Pre-reflective contradictory opinions of the type 
highlighted by the Bakhtin Circle are subsequently bracketed out of Habermas’s 
analytical oeuvre.  
Second, one important presupposition for Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action is that everyone should be allowed to express their true intentions and beliefs and 
be open about these (see Habermas 1990, pp. 82-83). Amongst other things, Habermas’s 
observations on intention move towards a passive understanding because the “full 
reproduction of that which is already given in the word” is ascertained by exploring how 
the word might gain ‘greater clarity’ (Bakhtin 1981, p. 281). After all, Habermas wants to 
integrate different words together in speech acts so that they gain greater clarity in a 
wider discursive system of validity claims. Intentionality, then, is ultimately 
intentionality towards a discursive system of meaning and not intentionality towards a 
dialogic and answerable thematic object (cf. Bakhtin 1981, p. 277).  
Let us take as an illustration the following communicative exchange based on a 
regulative speech act presented by Habermas: 
Speaker 1: “You are requested to stop smoking”. 
Hearer-Speaker 2: “Yes, I shall comply” (Habermas 1984, p. 296). 
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According to Habermas it is the illocutionary nature of speech acts which grounds the 
propositional content at an intersubjective level between a speaker and a hearer. Both 
components are necessary for communicative action to transpire. Habermas wants to 
further suggest that propositional content can be speech act invariant to the extent that a 
propositional content – “Peter’s smoking a pipe” – has the potential to appear in a 
number of speech acts: 
“I assert that Peter smokes a pipe”. 
“I beg of you (Peter) that you smoke a pipe”. 
“I ask you (Peter), do you smoke a pipe?” 
“I warn you (Peter), smoke a pipe” (Habermas 1979, p. 41). 
Even so, Habermas portrays communicative interaction here as being represented 
through clearly demarcated units of speech acts. Yet by breaking down real dialogue into 
discrete units (e.g. different speech acts) it is not at all clear where the beginning or end 
of these units occur. And so “(i)f their length is indefinite, which of their segments do we 
use when we break them down into units?” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 70).  
Think momentarily once again about ordinary speech. In everyday life people 
engaged in dialogue with one another do so in order to transmit information. As was 
noted in respect to the question of answerability, everyday speech is a mode for the 
transmission of information (Bakhtin 1981, p. 339). But transmission is not merely a 
linear one way flow of information: from speaker to hearer and then from hearer to 
speaker. That is to say, in real live speech people do not make clear cut standard 
statements of the sort Habermas highlights. Speech presented by Habermas therefore 
often seems to lack dialogic interaction because he creates a substitution in speech by his 
graphic-schematic representation of discourse through relatively unified speech acts; a 
graphic-schematic example being “You are requested to stop smoking” (cf. Bakhtin 
1986, p. 68). Habermas thus brackets off words from real speech processes and instead 
conceptualises them as being embedded in relatively unified speech acts and as being 
uttered by relatively unified individuals. Habermas isolates a graphic-schematic set of 
speech styles – a specific set of speech acts – and elevates these as being the determining 
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properties of language as a whole (cf. Bakhtin 1981, pp. 263-266). “One cannot say that 
these diagrams are false or that they do not correspond to certain aspects of reality. But 
when they are put forth as the actual whole of speech communication, they become a 
scientific fiction” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 68). In real live dialogic events there is no singular 
graphic-schematic representation in which words relate to an object. A theme for 
example will be infiltrated by a variety of utterances concerning the same object and it is 
impossible to reduce this to three (or more) singular speech acts. Passive understanding 
of utterances often results from graphic-schematic representations leading one to posit 
“an abstract of the actual whole of actively responsive understanding…” (Bakhtin 1986, 
p. 68). 
Finally, and as we saw in the previous section, Habermas usually assumes that 
speech occurs at a face-to-face level between speaker and hearer so that the obligation to 
provide validity claims also occurs at this level. No necessary reason exists however why 
the obligation to justify one’s claims should be made at a face-to-face level. Indeed, if we 
take seriously Bakhtin’s observation that background language is inherently dialogical 
then we can begin to investigate how dialogue has the potential to take place between a 
solitary individual and background language. Or, more precisely, even when alone 
individuals still nevertheless adopt an attitude towards themselves based within and upon 
attitudes that others have about them. We are constantly “eavesdropping” on how others 
are speaking about us even if they are not physically present to us; we think in a dialogic 
manner by ourselves. For example, we create rejoinders in our mind around 
conversations with others at events we have had or will be involved with and we intonate 
specific words with accents in our own mind and this enables us to evaluate past and 
potential dialogue when we do enter unique empirical events (Bakhtin 1984, pp. 206-
208). As Walker (1995, pp. 110-111) indicates, this view of language moves beyond 
those theorists such as Habermas who tend to emphasise moral consensus building 
around relatively unified principles. On Bakhtin’s estimation, a truly ethical position 
should pay close attention to the dialogical pervasiveness of a moral background in which 
one’s own ‘double-voiced personality’ is deeply embedded. As a result, what might 
appear to be relatively unified principles of validity or morality held by individuals can in 
fact turn out to be enmeshed in a diverse range of conflicting ethical standpoints palpable 
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in the most intimate and private spheres of life. Far from providing certainty, the very 
nature of this dialogical environment frequently makes us unsure or uncertain about our 
sense of identity. And it is exactly at this moment of uncertainty where we move away 
from unified principles that we engage forcefully in acts of deliberation.  
In the next three sections these points will developed in more depth by focusing 
on validity claims and their relationship to universalism. It will be argued that while 
Habermas and the Bakhtin Circle once again share remarkable similarities on their 
understanding on validity claims there are nevertheless significant differences between 
them. In particular, each holds a different viewpoint about how validity claims can be 
said to be ‘universal’ moments of social interaction. What will be suggested is that the  
Bakhtin Circle’s insistence on universal unrepeatable indeterminacy in dialogue mediated 
through necessary universal contradictions enables them to argue that ‘norms’ in 
language must be based on a notion of answerability.  
 
Validity claims and universalism 
In a passage that bears a notable resemblance to Habermas, Bakhtin says: 
Every utterance makes a claim to justice, sincerity, beauty, and truthfulness…And 
these values of utterances are defined not by their relation to the language (as a 
purely linguistic system), but by various forms of relation to reality, to the 
speaking subject and to other…utterances…(Bakhtin 1986, p. 123). 
It appears to be the case that Bakhtin is making a similar observation about validity 
claims to that made by Habermas. On closer inspection, however, there are again 
noticeable differences between the two. Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance suggests that 
each dialogic event instigates new thematic possibilities within an array of possible 
genres. There are thus no conventions as such in the sense of settled agreements. In fact, 
Bakhtin is quite firm in his judgement that utterances create something new and 
unrepeatable at each dialogic event which, at the same time, generate “some relation to 
value (the true, the good, the beautiful, and so forth)” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 120). This leads 
Bakhtin to say that only the utterance establishes a meaningful relationship with other 
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utterances. “Only an utterance can be faithful (or unfaithful), sincere, true (false), 
beautiful, just, and so forth” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 122). Bakhtin subsequently reverses 
Habermas’s original schema. It is not validity claims which give utterances normative 
meaning but is instead the capacity of utterances to give validity claims a meaningful 
significance in everyday life. Unique and unrepeatable utterances therefore pertain “to 
honesty, truth, goodness, beauty, history” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 105) to a greater degree than 
that of validity claims.  
 However, there are at least two ways in which one sympathetic to Habermas 
might respond. First, one might be inclined to agree with Hirschkop’s view that while 
Bakhtin alludes to the obligation, or a sense of commitment, one feels towards distinct 
values in a unique dialogic event, it is also the case that Habermas broadly shares this 
outlook. That is to say, Habermas, like Bakhtin, believes that discourse places an 
obligation on interlocutors to take “yes or no positions” by making them give reasons for 
their arguments (Hirschkop 1999, pp. 210-211).  
 The second response is to suggest that Habermas provides a complementary way 
of thinking about norms to that provided by the Bakhtin Circle. For example, to ensure 
that argumentation in a context of relevance is fair and will be counted as valid to all 
concerned Habermas suggests that at least two further procedures are required: Discourse 
(D) and Universalisation (U). (D) is defined by Habermas along the following:  
Only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance of all 
concerned in practical discourse (Habermas 1998, p. 41). 
(U) is defined by Habermas thus: 
A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general 
observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be 
jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion (Habermas 1998, p. 42, italics 
in the original). 
In setting out (D) and (U) Habermas is not saying that a universal consensus must 
be reached by participants during a discursive encounter. Instead he is suggesting that the 
normative procedures of argumentation through which a consensus is reached is of 
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utmost importance – the idea that norms can only be seen as legitimate if all those 
concerned and who might be affected by the norms in question have freely agreed to their 
legitimacy. As Moon (1995, pp. 150-151) indicates, these procedures lend credence to 
Habermas’s conviction that practical discourse helps to ascertain which moral norms we 
should follow and observe as opposed to which values we might pursue. The latter 
pursuit enters the realm of what constitutes the “good life”, which Habermas feels is not 
the concern of practical discourse as such. However, what constitutes the good life, or at 
least what allows us to continuously assert our unique different identities despite 
centralizing monologic tendencies in dialogue, is indeed highlighted by the Bakhtin 
Circle. One might therefore say that for Habermas universalism is grounded in procedural 
discourse whereas for the Bakhtin Circle universalism remains dialogically unfinalised 
(see also Nielsen 2002, pp. 46-47). As such, while they both hold different views on how 
to conceptualise universalism they are not necessarily incompatible with one another. 
Habermas allows us to think about moral norms while the Bakhtin Circle allows us to 
think about what might constitute the good life.   
Without doubt, both responses do illustrate similarities between Habermas and the 
Bakhtin Circle on and around the issues of validity claims and universalism. Be this as it 
may there are a number of problems with them from a Bakhtinian viewpoint. The first 
concerns the relationship between obligation and relevance while the second concerns 
how universalism should be conceptualised. 
 
Obligation and relevance 
First, it is questionable whether Bakhtin can in fact be assimilated quite so readily with 
Habermas’s position on the issue of obligation. After all, for Habermas the obligation to 
give a “yes or no” response arises only when a “context of relevance” is brought within 
the horizon of taken-for-granted background assumptions. For instance, it might be case 
that a new worker in an organisation is not yet insured against accidental injury. This 
issue could then become a context of relevance and subsequently enter the thematic field 
therein so that workers render problematic this state of affairs through one of three 
validity claims (Habermas 1987, p. 124). Shifting meanings in a background horizon are 
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thereby reliant on an explicit moment of relevance, as when something becomes 
consciously known between participants. Apart from situations like this background 
assumptions are rarely acknowledged by participants.  
But as argued previously this is different to how the Bakhtin Circle conceptualises 
background language. According to the Bakhtin Circle, background language is 
constantly in flux to such a degree that ‘yes or no’ responses are already contained in the 
multiaccentual nature of utterances irrespective of whether or not they emerge in a 
context of relevance. Bakhtin is therefore more radical than Habermas on this issue to the 
extent that he believes that every speech situation carries with it a moment of contingency 
and indeterminacy because each speech situation is a unique and unrepeatable event (see 
Bakhtin 1990, p. 118). Norms as such make no sense in the ‘abstract’ but only become 
meaningful through each dialogic event in which refracted concrete utterances live and 
breathe. Even a norm that encourages discussion between individuals about particular 
concrete utterances is in danger of smothering the contingency and indeterminacy at an 
event. This is because a norm is often simply “a verbal form for conveying the adaptation 
of certain theoretical propositions to a particular end” (Bakhtin 1993, p. 24); or, in 
Habermasian terms, it is a validity claim which proscribes ways of acting in an empirical 
situation.  
Habermas might very well argue that his validity claims merely refer to 
argumentative procedures and not to Kantian a priori duties of ‘ought’. Yet it is still 
nevertheless the case that his validity claims proscribe specific theoretical propositions 
onto unique dialogic events ensuring that an ethical ought “is tacked on from the outside” 
to dialogic events (Bakhtin 1993, p. 23). Habermas’s ideal speech situation thus acts as a 
stable and self-equivalent ‘signal’ to speakers. In this respect the ideal speech situation is 
a technical device that allows speakers to recognise each other’s shared identity in the 
sense of sharing an identity through the same validity claims. But this will not necessarily 
elicit understanding between speakers because it is not inevitable that speakers will 
recognise the concrete uniqueness of one another through validity claims. After all, 
validity claims for Habermas have a special relationship with speech acts, and yet for the 
Bakhtin Circle only an utterance, and not therefore a speech act, has the potential to 
create understanding. Only an utterance moves beyond fixed identity in order to 
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illuminate the unrepeatable novelty of a dialogic event, which will then lend itself to 
understanding between speakers (Voloshinov 1973, p. 68). Hence, ‘ought’ for Bakhtin 
can only meaningfully exist as ought-as-event, or as Being-as-event. If this is true then 
abstract categories gain validity in a once-occurrent dialogic event where they enter into 
an essential relationship with emotional-volitional valuations embodied in utterances 
(Bakhtin 1993, p. 33).  
 
Dialectical universalism 
This brings us to the second and perhaps more controversial point. The Bakhtin Circle 
encourages us to situate dialogue in a universal moment mediated through dialectical 
processes and social relations. The reason why this is a somewhat controversial statement 
to make is that Bakhtin is often seen even by Bakhtinians to advocate an anti-dialectical 
social theory. Morson and Emerson (1990), for example, argue that Bakhtin was hostile 
to dialectical thinking, not least because “(d)ialectics abstracts the dialogic from 
dialogue” because it aims to reduce concrete, creative and inventive utterances to reified 
teleological systems (Morson and Emerson 1990, p. 57). More generally, it is argued that 
the sort of dialogical outlook favoured by Bakhtin precludes the monological tendencies 
evident in dialectical thinking. Dialectics finalises dialogic exchange to the extent that it 
posits a universal logical sequence of self-development through to the inevitable 
realisation of a perfect final form. No one consciousness can thereby claim the dialectic 
as its own and incorporate it into their unique personality because the dialectic dissolves 
concrete specificity into one all-embracing system (Nikulin 2006, pp. 149-151). 
Conversely, dialogical thinking seeks to recapture this sense of concrete specificity from 
the dialectic through the idea of the unrepeatable utterance.  
There is of course some textual evidence for this view of dialectics in Bakhtin’s 
work. Resolute in his rejection of dialectical readings of his hero, Dostoevsky, Bakhtin 
says of the great Russian novelist that while oppositions can be detected in his literary 
works these do not imply that a Hegelian dialectical spirit is also present. Dostoevsky 
writes about the contradictory and pluralistic relationship amongst many consciousnesses 
which never find resolution “in the unity of an evolving spirit” (Bakhtin 1984, p. 26). 
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Indeed, such a unified spirit is essentially a monologic way of writing exactly because it 
suffocates interacting dialogic personalities (Bakhtin 1984, pp. 26-27; see also, pp. 30-
31). But does this also imply as some suggest it does that Bakhtin rejects all dialectical 
thinking?  
As can be noted from the quotes just given, Bakhtin (1984) is quite rightly critical 
of idealist elements in Hegelian dialectics. But just a few paragraphs later after his 
admonishment of idealist dialectics Bakhtin sets out the theoretical standpoint he prefers; 
a standpoint which can conceivably be described as materialist dialectics. According to 
Bakhtin, one of the problems with the idealist dialectic is that it reduces material 
contradictions evident in social life to the spiritual lives of individuals. It then 
incorporates this subjectivism into a unified dialectically evolving spirit which moves 
through a linear trajectory of historical stages. For Bakhtin, we need to place this dialectic 
back in “the objective social world” (Bakhtin 1984, p. 27). In practice this involves 
viewing the social world as being complexly stratified through different interacting 
societal levels and as being mediated by various contradictory relationships. A creative 
author is thus one who comprehends “the extensive and well-developed contradictions 
which (co-exist) among people – among people, not among ideas in a single 
consciousness” (Bakhtin 1984, p. 27). To recognise the reality of these objective 
contradictions implies moving beyond subjectivity and its relationship to a linear 
evolutionary theory of history in favour of “the visualization of contradictions as forces 
coexisting simultaneously…” (Bakhtin 1984, p. 28). This is to embrace a dialectical 
philosophy and sociology of internal relations whereby different universal material 
contradictions of a system are refracted into one another in often contingent and 
unpredictable ways to produce new dialogic events in particular contexts (see Bakhtin 
1984, p. 202). Two further points can be made in this respect. 
In the first instance, and as has already been pointed out in previous sections and 
by others (e.g. Côté 2000; Dop 2000; Roberts 2004b), the Bakhtin Circle clearly believes 
that each concrete context refracts the complexity and contradictions of social life at 
different levels of abstraction (see Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 14). More precisely, 
they argue that a concrete context refracts the determinations of 1) contradictory 
socioeconomic relations mediated through an exploitative division of labour such as that 
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which exists in capitalism between capital and labour, which are themselves refracted in 
2) contradictory social relations evident in other social forms, that in turn react back upon 
socioeconomic relations (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 18; see also Marx 1966, p. 
791). This dialectical position thus suggests that a particular concrete context internalises 
and refracts historically specific universal social relations.  
Working in part from a Bakhtinian perspective, Engeström (1987) for example 
observes that historically specific universal contradictions are reproduced at various 
concrete levels in capitalist societies. Engeström illustrates this point with the example of 
a doctor. In his or her surgery a doctor will obviously make use of work instruments such 
as prescription drugs. At the same time the doctor has to contend with the 
commodification of these instruments. Drugs for example are manufactured by corporate 
drug companies and sold for profit, while health services become increasingly subject to 
market mechanisms and to profit margins.
3
 Engeström (1987) argues that these ‘primary 
contradictions’ (that is, contradictions directly associated with commodification and 
pressures associated with the extraction of surplus value and profit) are reproduced as 
more concrete ‘secondary contradictions’. In the case of doctors, as Foot and Groleau 
(2011) suggest, a secondary contradiction could manifest itself as a pressure to see more 
patients in less time in order to tackle increasing market pressures imposed by politicians 
on GP surgeries. A doctor thus faces the secondary contradiction of having to allocate 
less time to patients and more time to overseeing the daily business costs of running a 
surgery. To combat this secondary contradiction a new set of practices are implemented. 
Perhaps new administrators or new doctors are hired. However, these new employees 
might start to implement their own practices that explicitly criticise the increasing use of 
market mechanisms at this particular GP surgery. But these practices contradict market 
ideologies of private insurance companies that work with the surgery, and so on. The 
point to make from this example is that the particularity of a concrete context (a doctor’s 
surgery) refracts in its identity (in its social form) those historically specific 
contradictions associated with universal exploitative capitalist social relations (see Jones 
                                                          
 
3
 For a brilliant expose of the privatisation of the UK’s National Health Service see Leys and Player (2011).  
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2009). As such a concrete context will internalise and reproduce existing and new 
contradictions that will also become enmeshed in dialogue. 
In the second instance, and following the previous point, the Bakhtin Circle 
argues that it is crucial to make “concrete material reality” the primary area of research 
(Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 12). This is because one needs to understand how an 
object of analysis gains its unique refracted identity not only through abstract meanings 
but more importantly through concrete ideological and social meaning gained through 
dialogic events. In other words, refracted concrete dialogic events are the medium 
through which more abstract universal contradictory social relations become meaningful 
for ordinary people (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, pp. 8-9). Given this, we arrive at a 
second meaning of universalism for the Bakhtin Circle, which refers primarily to the 
“universalism of contextual meaning…” (Bakhtin 1986, p. 145). This second meaning of 
universalism is related with the first meaning – abstract universal systemic contradictions 
– because 1) abstract universal contradictions must try to surpass and transgress their 
inherent limitations across the concrete forms of the system as a whole, so that 2) 
interrelated concrete forms constantly undergo an “active dialectical process of 
generation” (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978, p. 14) as contradictions endeavour to 
overcome their inherent limitations. Subsequently, it is at concrete dialogic events that 
ordinary people experience first hand, and can communicate with one another about, the 
effects of more abstract contradictions. Indeed, Bakhtin suggests that speakers should aim 
to transform an abstract “thinglike environment” into a concrete semantic context – or 
dialogic event – so that they might then think of ways to overcome specific contradictions 
which confront them and which limit their own potentials.   
What the Bakhtin Circle therefore attempts to convince us of is that dialogic 
relations become a truly participative activity when both senses of universalism come 
together as “actual, once-occurrent” Being-as-event (Bakhtin 1993, p. 15). At this 
moment speakers through dialogue with one another make themselves answerable to 
specific historical contradictions and they make these contradictions answerable to their 
own unique personality and lived experienced. Consensus based on (U) – Habermas’s 
standpoint – leads to a lack of uniqueness and to a loss of Being-as-event because 
historical specificity is dissolved through abstract validity claims (“possible Being”). This 
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also leads to the emergence of second-hand truths because utterances emerge from an 
outside and final source of validity (Bakhtin 1984, pp. 55-59). For Bakhtin, dialogic truth 
should instead be a participative act that has “never existed before and can never be 
repeated… and constitutes an answerable continuation in the spirit of the whole…” 
(Bakhtin 1993, p. 40). ‘Truth’ is being in a contingent space in order to comprehend how 
a specific range of utterances are connected to a whole array of other answerable 
utterances and languages in a systemic historical whole. As Garvey (2000, p. 382) makes 
clear, Bakhtin (1981, p. 296) insists that the recognition of one’s own utterances being 
enmeshed in a complex mediation of “internally variegated languages” creates a basis to 
critically reflect on the systems, or concrete whole, of dialogue that affect the way we 
view the world.  
 
Conclusion 
Cooke has suggested that critics such as Benhabib who claim that Habermas neglects a 
concrete level of analysis have misinterpreted the rationale of the Habermasian 
enterprise. Accordingly Habermas’s theory of argumentation demonstrates that 
participants “must be willing (in principle) to consider the arguments of everyone, no 
matter how poorly they are articulated, and to attach (in principle) equal weight to these 
arguments” (Cooke 1994, p. 160, italics in the original). Argumentation must therefore 
consider and respect the views of others in reaching a consensus. “This means, on the one 
hand, a recognition of everyone’s equal entitlement to introduce new topics into 
discussion and to express needs and desires and, on the other, a willingness to confront 
the arguments of others in a fair and unbiased way” (Cooke 1994, p. 160). Each 
participant should be guided by universal moral respect for the other’s argument and by 
egalitarian reciprocity. In itself this does not constitute a set of transcendentally binding 
norms of action but instead constitutes a set of argumentative duties and rights within the 
parameters of a discourse (Habermas 1998, pp. 44-45). As Cooke goes on to observe, 
such principles are not as Benhabib and other critics maintain moral arguments but are 
the very presuppositions of argumentation. In other words, these principles create a way 
of assessing the conduct of argumentation and not the arguments themselves. And so, for 
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example, “judgements cannot be criticized on the basis of the knowledge they embody; 
they can be criticized only on the basis of the way in which they are reached” (Cooke 
1994, p. 161; see also White 1988, pp. 73-74).   
Cooke’s response to the critics on this point is both illuminating and important. 
Certainly it forcibly highlights a concrete procedural moment in Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action; a moment which is often overlooked by his critics. However, this 
paper has suggested that Habermas’s theory of discourse is found wanting from a 
Bakhtinian perspective. According to the Bakhtin Circle dialogue can take one of two 
forms (Kent 1993, pp. 152-153). First, there is dialogue premised on face-to-face 
encounters between speakers and hearers (Voloshinov 1973, p. 95). Often dialogue in this 
instance is studied through distinctive “compositional forms” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 279) such 
as through speech acts. Second, however, there exists dialogism and this more dynamic 
use of language explores how single utterances are “only a moment in the continuous 
process of verbal communication” (Voloshinov 1973, p. 95, italics in the original). By 
this observation Voloshinov means that dialogism exists at different levels of abstraction 
in the “all-inclusive, generative process of a given social collective” (Voloshinov 1973, p. 
95). Concrete utterances internalise and refract both verbal and non-verbal social 
processes, which is why Voloshinov is adamant that dialogism can accompany a whole 
host of dialogic interaction: face-to-face communication, a book, surveys, media, 
performance art, and so on. Dialogic events, or the utterance as a whole as the Bakhtin 
Circle also term them, consist precisely in examining utterances in such a way  
In many respects Habermas can be said to study discourse rather than dialogism. 
Habermas is more interested in the first type of dialogue, namely the compositional form 
of speech. From a Bakhtinian perspective while such an approach does open up important 
and interesting avenues to study language it also tends to study discourse at the level of 
clarity – being clear about speech acts and validity claims – rather than at the level of 
refracted utterances and dialogism (cf. Bakhtin 1981, p. 280). For the Bakhtin Circle, 
procedural democracy must at a minimum work in synthesis with faithfulness towards the 
fullness of the dialogic event (Bakhtin 1993, p. 38). This means being faithful not only to 
procedural principles such as “the contentual constancy of a principle, of a right, of a law, 
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and even less so of being” (Bakhtin 1993, p. 38) but also implies being faithful to the 
whole uniqueness of answerable and unrepeatable concrete dialogic acts.  
Unsurprisingly therefore Bakhtin rejects those discursive approaches – as 
exemplified by a Habermasian perspective – which “think that truth (pravda) can only be 
the truth (istina) that is composed of universal moments; that the truth of a situation is 
precisely that which is repeatable and constant in it” (Bakhtin 1993, p. 37). On the 
contrary, and as Nikulin (2006, pp. 220-221) observes, the Bakhtin Circle reject theories 
of language that overly stress the importance of what is repeatable and thus trans-
historically universal because this leads to the telos of reaching a consensus. The Bakhtin 
Circle is more interested in the unfinalizable nature of dialogue, how one’s self as both a 
person and other is dialogically entwined in the other of others and entwined in a series of 
concrete mediations, and how we understand these processes in and through dialogue 
itself. Agreement and understanding between interlocutors is first and foremost 
agreement on the unfinalizability of dialogue. Consensus may result from unfinalizability 
but it is not a necessity (see also Koczanowicz 2011). 
. A further advantage of this standpoint is that it is attuned to the contingency of 
hegemonic power relations to the extent that it questions the supposed completed form 
that a socially constructed consensus must assume. Bakhtinian ideas about utterances 
forces us to critically analyse the constitution of concrete dialogic events including how 
socio-ideological contradictions come to be stabilised over time into a consensus which 
benefits some to the detriment of others (see Steinberg 1998, p. 858). If one of the 
original intentions of early Critical Theory in the guise of Adorno, et al. was “to 
challenge the very requirement of any moral universalism from the particular” (Morris 
2001, p. 157) then the Bakhtin Circle can be said to share many similarities with these 
early theorists than with Habermas.   
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